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INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND EBOLA RESPONSE: 
LEARNING FROM THE 2017 OUTBREAK IN THE DEMOCRATIC 
REPUBLIC OF CONGO† 
SAM HALABI,* REBECCA KATZ** & AMANDA M CLELLANDC *** 
INTRODUCTION 
On July 17, 2019, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared that the 
Ebola outbreak in east Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was a public 
health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) under the International 
Health Regulations (2005) (IHR), the fifth declaration since the agreement 
entered into force in 2007.1 Despite availability of a vaccine and the introduction 
of a second vaccine candidate, the current Ebola outbreak has not been brought 
under control. As of this writing, many public health officials are worried over 
border closures, even though WHO did not recommend travel or trade 
 
† Data included in this article resulted from work funded by Resolve to Save Lives and the 
Wellcome Trust. 
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 1. Int’l Health Regulations (2005) Emergency Comm. for Ebola Virus Disease in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Statement on the meeting of the International Health 
Regulations (2005) Emergency Committee for Ebola virus disease in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo on 17 July 2019 (2019), https://www.who.int/ihr/procedures/statement-emergency-
committee-ebola-drc-july-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/MGM4-FYJ7]; Helen Branswell, WHO 
Declares Ebola Outbreak an International Emergency, July 17, 2019 avaialable at https://www.stat 
news.com/2019/07/17/who-declares-ebola-outbreak-an-international-health-emergency/ 
[https://perma.cc/QYP3-FBHD] (“This marks only the fifth time the WHO has declared a public 
health emergency of international concern.”). 
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restrictions. Armed conflict and local resistance in the region has stymied the 
global response. 
These events are reminiscent of the 2014-16 Ebola outbreak in West Africa, 
when the aftermath of civil conflict, the closure of borders, and a fragmented 
initial response contributed to the most deadly Ebola outbreak on record.2 The 
resulting retrospective criticism, comprised of no fewer than seven major and 
approximately forty international collaborative reviews, called into question the 
effective implementation of the IHR.3 Trade and travel restrictions imposed by 
the neighbors of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone as well as other European 
and African countries strongly suggested that in the face of a real pandemic 
emergency, the countries of the world could be relied upon to abandon 
internationalism and international institutions and adopt country-first policies, 
no matter how counterproductive. 
While calls for reform were justified and many of the recommendations 
following the 2014 West Africa Ebola outbreak are under way, the purpose of 
this article is to shed light on a subsequent episode of Ebola outbreak and 
response in the DRC that emphasizes the effective implementation of not only 
the IHR, but the successful incorporation of international collaborative 
relationships that quickly addressed an outbreak in the northern DRC, and paved 
the way for the rapid deployment of biomedical interventions. The DRC’s 
surveillance system identified Ebola quickly, bolstered by a national planning 
system revised in light of the West Africa Ebola outbreak, WHO and 
international partners including the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC), the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red 
Crescent, and Doctors Without Borders responded quickly and adroitly, and the 
outbreak ended with only eight cases.4 Identifying effective implementation of 
international law when outbreak responses succeed—in some cases despite 
numerous barriers and limited resources—can assist in articulating fully-
developed strategies for improving future outbreak responses and global health 
security. It argues that the IHR may be, and often are, an iterative or learning 
agreement, and that much learning informed the DRC response in 2017 and two 
outbreak responses in 2018. Given that the current outbreak in the DRC has not, 
as of this writing, been brought under control, it is important to understand the 
limits of this thesis even within the conditions we analyze. Yet, we believe that 
understanding how learning works within the IHR implementation process may 
 
 2. G.A. Res. 69/1, 1 (Sep. 23 2014); S.C. Res. 2177, 1–3, ¶ 3–4 (Sep. 18, 2014). 
 3. Surie Moon et al., Will Ebola change the game? Ten essential reforms before the next 
pandemic. The report of the Harvard-LSHTM Independent Panel on the Global Response to Ebola, 
386 LANCET 2204, 2207 (2015). 
 4. 2017 Democratic Republic of the Congo - Bas Uélé District Outbreak Report, CENTER 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL, CDC.GOV, https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/drc/2017-may.html 
[https://perma.cc/D8QQ-AYGB] (last visited August 23, 2019). 
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lead to better compliance and better outcomes including the cohesive 
cooperation between national and international actors. 
Methodologically, the Article applies the obligations imposed under 
Articles 4-6 and 13 of the IHR to the two Ebola outbreaks and demonstrates how 
the DRC system internalized the lessons of the 2014-16 Ebola outbreak. Articles 
4-15 of the IHR are the primary information sharing and public health readiness 
provisions.5 Articles 7-12 and Article 14 are not separately analyzed either 
because their obligations are relevant within a previous discussion (e.g. Article 
9 deals with “other reports” WHO may receive to determine whether there is a 
public health emergency of international concern,6 but that analysis is 
undertaken with respect to Article 5) or because they are simply not relevant to 
the analysis (e.g. those provisions dealing exclusively with WHO decision-
making). The Article then compares the national-international nexus for each 
outbreak and response. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides the legal background to the 
two Ebola outbreaks—the IHR—and the etiological and epidemiological 
background to Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) more generally. Part II identifies the 
failures of international public health law between April 2014 and May 2015 
and compares those failures with the success of the IHR between May and July 
2017 in the DRC. Part III provides a conclusion. 
I.  THE INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS AND THE EBOLA THREAT 
When international law-makers established WHO they intended to give it 
strong law-making and regulatory authority.7 Article 19 of the WHO 
Constitution authorized it to conclude treaties within its broadly worded 
mandate while Article 21 gave the World Health Assembly the authority to adopt 
legally binding recommendations in five discrete areas: sanitary and quarantine 
regulations; nomenclatures on diseases, causes of death, and public health 
practices; standards for diagnostic procedures for international use; standards for 
safety, purity, and potency of biological, pharmaceutical, and similar products 
moving in international commerce; and advertising and labeling of biological, 
pharmaceutical, and similar products moving in international commerce.8 
Article 22 established the binding legal effect of these regulations unless states 
opted out of them within the notification period, an innovation which collapsed 
 
 5. WORLD HEALTH ORG., International Health Regulations, arts. 4–15 (2005), 
https://www.who.int/ihr/publications/9789241580496/en/ [https://perma.cc/D4YE-LJ36]. 
 6. WORLD HEALTH ORG., International Health Regulations, arts. 7–12, 14 (2005), 
https://www.who.int/ihr/publications/9789241580496/en/ [https://perma.cc/MN6S-R66P]. 
 7. George Codding, Jr., Contributions of the World Health Organization and the 
International Civil Aviation Organization to the Development of International Law, 59 
PROCEEDINGS OF ASIL 147, 147-48 (1965). 
 8. WORLD HEALTH ORG., Const. arts. 19, 21. 
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the usual drawn-out ratification process historically experienced in the 
international law-making process.9  
One of the first exercises of this authority was to adopt the International 
Sanitary Regulations, an international agreement that resurrected and 
rationalized moribund international treaties that addressed international traffic 
and quarantine policies oriented at plague, cholera, yellow fever, smallpox, 
louse-borne typhus, and relapsing fever.10 WHO updated the regulations and 
renamed them in 1969 (hence the official name of the agreement, the 
International Health Regulations (1969)), eventually narrowing their reach to 
yellow fever, cholera, and plague by 1981 and expanding the monitoring and 
control mechanisms applicable to those diseases.11 The resurgence of cholera in 
South America, plague in India, and Ebola in Africa, as well as the emergence 
of HIV as a global pandemic, encouraged the world’s countries to consider 
further, more extensive revision.12 
The 1980s and 1990s witnessed the emergence of new infectious diseases 
like HIV and viral hemorrhagic fevers.13 Between 1994 and 2000, for example, 
there were as many outbreaks of EVD in Africa as there had been in the twenty 
years before.14 In 1995, the World Health Assembly, the governing body of 
WHO, instructed WHO’s Director General to revisit the IHR precisely because 
they neglected “the emergence of new infectious agents” and failed to provide 
for an adequate response of those that were covered.15 The World Health 
Assembly attributed these failures to the erosion of barriers between goods and 
people.16 In 2003, the outbreak of SARS facilitated the 2005 revisions of the 
 
 9. WORLD HEALTH ORG., Const. arts. 19, 21–22. 
 10. Editorial, International Sanitary Regulations, 147 [J]AMA 62, 63–64 (1951). 
 11. Richard A. Cash & Vasant Narasimhan, Impediments to global surveillance of infectious 
diseases: consequences of open reporting in a global economy, 78 BULLETIN OF THE WORLD 
HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] 1358, 1359 (2000), https://www.who.int/bulletin/archives/78 
(11)1358.pdf [https://perma.cc/52A2-N546]. 
 12. Frequently asked questions about the International Health Regulations (2005), 
WHO.GOV, https://www.who.int/ihr/about/faq/en/ [https://perma.cc/9WND-8NYA]. 
 13. David P. Fidler & Lawrence O. Gostin, The New International Health Regulations: An 
Historic Development for International law and Public Health, 34 J.L. MED. ETHICS 85, 85 (2006). 
 14. Ramon Martinez, Chronology of Ebola Virus Disease outbreaks, 1976-2014, HEALTH 
INTELLIGENCE (June 10, 2014, 4:01 AM), http://publichealthintelligence.org/content/chronology-
ebola-virus-disease-outbreaks-1976-2014 [https://perma.cc/529K-26KE]. 
 15. WHO - Revision process of the International Health Regulations (IHR), WHO.GOV, 
http://www.who.int/ihr/revisionprocess/revision/en/index.html [https://perma.cc/KC82-NALZ] 
(last visited August 30, 2019). 
 16. Rebeca Katz & Julie Fischer, The Revised International Health Regulations: A Framework 
for Global Pandemic Response, 3 GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE 1, 2 (2010). The threat of the 
Ebola virus and the emerging HIV/AIDS crisis (among other viruses) were major factors the global 
community considered when advocating revisions to the existing IHR. Id. 
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IHR, by highlighting the speed by which an emerging infectious disease can 
travel around the world and the dearth of tools to govern the global spread.17 
A. The Scope of the IHR (2005) 
The IHR (2005) was revised to encompass the detection and prevention of 
all infectious diseases.18 Their scope was expanded “to include any event that 
would constitute a public health emergency of international concern.”19 “‘The 
Regulations now encompass public health risks whatever their origin or source 
(Article 1.1), including: (1) naturally occurring infectious diseases, whether of 
known or unknown etiological origin . . .’”20 
Acknowledging the importance of communication and cooperation to 
successful detection and prevention of communicable diseases, States Parties are 
obligated to “develop the means to detect, report, and respond to public health 
emergencies . . . [and] establish a National IHR Focal Point (NFP)21 for 
communication to and from WHO . . . .”22 States Parties must inform WHO 
within twenty-four hours of an assessment of any event that could be considered 
a “public health risk to other States requiring a coordinated international 
response.”23 Ebola was a specified disease in the revised IHR, Annex 2, that is, 
its detection was likely to have significant public health impact and to potentially 
spread internationally.24 
 
 17. David P. Fidler, Revision of the World Health Organization’s International Health 
Regulations, ASIL INSIGHTS (April 16, 2004), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/8/issue/8/ 
revision-world-health-organizations-international-health-regulations [https://perma.cc/G4Y5-BH 
8B]. 
 18. The stated purpose is to “prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health 
response to the international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate with and restricted 
to public health risks, and which avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and 
trade.” WORLD HEALTH ORG., International Health Regulations, art. 2 (2005), https://www.who. 
int/ihr/publications/9789241580496/en/ [https://perma.cc/ZGX4-3EAX]. 
 19. Katz & Fischer, supra note 16, at 2. 
 20. Martin Cetron, Isolation, Quarantine, and Infectious Disease Threats Arising From 
Global Migration, GLOBAL MANAGEMENT OF INFECTIOUS DISEASE AFTER EBOLA, 245, 251 (Sam 
F. Halabi, Lawrence O. Gostin, and Jeffrey S. Crowley eds. 2017) (quoting Fidler & Gostin, supra 
note 13, at 86). 
 21. The NFP is a “national centre, established or designated by each State Party [and] must be 
accessible at all times for IHR (2005)-related communications with WHO.” International Health 
Regulations Coordination, INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS (2005): TOOLKIT FOR 
IMPLEMENTATION IN NATIONAL LEGISLATION 7 (2009). As of July 2009, ninety-nine percent of 
all State have established an NFP. Id. 
 22. Katz & Fischer, supra note 16, at 2-3. 
 23. Id. at 3. Once an incident has been reported, WHO will then “coordinate communications 
across nations, provide technical assistance to responding nations, and work with international 
scientific experts to develop recommendations for mitigating the consequences of the event.” Id. 
 24. WORLD HEALTH ORG., International Health Regulations, annex 2 (2005), 
https://www.who.int/ihr/publications/9789241580496/en/ [https://perma.cc/Z68Y-FNK8]. 
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Epidemiological investigations have revealed that human infections with the 
Ebola virus are associated with the handling of infected chimpanzees, gorillas, 
fruit bats, monkeys, forest antelope, and porcupines.25 Human-to-human 
transmission of Ebola occurs through close and direct physical contact with 
infected bodily fluids; the most infectious being blood, feces, and vomit.26 The 
2013-15 outbreak was the twenty-fourth known outbreak of Ebola and by far the 
most severe.27 A new outbreak occurred in the DRC in August of 2014, May of 
2017, and then the following year on April 4, 2018.28 For the latter outbreak, “a 
total of 38 laboratory confirmed and 15 probable cases (deaths for which it was 
not possible to collect laboratory specimens for testing) have been reported.29 
Of these 53 cases, 29 died, giving a case fatality ratio of 54.7%.”30 On August 
1, 2018, a new outbreak was officially declared in North Kivu province of the 
DRC, on the other side of the country from the April outbreak, an outbreak that 
continues, fueled by armed conflict and interference with the international 
response effort.31 With a case fatality rate of 55%, Ebola remains a biomedical 
research priority.32  
II.  IHR PERFORMANCE FROM 2014-16 WEST AFRICA TO 2017 DRC 
A. Background to the 2014 West Africa Outbreak 
Although the outbreak of EVD in West Africa originated in Guinea between 
December of 2013 and March of 2014, it spread more rapidly in the eastern 
regions of Sierra Leone and then in North Central Liberia, followed by 
Nzérékoré in Guinea.33 “Between December 2013 and April 10, 2016, a total of 
 
 25. Ebola Virus Disease, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (May 30, 2019), http://www.who.int/news-
room/fact-sheets/detail/ebola-virus-disease [https://perma.cc/G5F6-UFGD]. 
 26. Seth Judson, et al., Understanding Ebola Virus Transmission, VIRUSES (Feb. 3, 2015), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4353901/ [https://perma.cc/2Q9M-29KR]. 
 27. Johnathan Corum, A History of Ebola in 24 Outbreaks, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/12/30/science/history-of-ebola-in-24-outbreaks.html 
[https://perma.cc/38VW-4A8K]. 
 28. Health Emergency Information and Risk Management, WORLD HEALTH ORG., Ebola 
Virus Disease: Democratic Republic of Congo External Situation Report 15 (Jul. 12, 2018), 
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/273088/SITREP_EVD_DRC_20180712-eng.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U3YB-ADE2]. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Megan Specia, Years After Latest Ebola Outbreak New Cases Emerge in Congo, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/01/world/africa/ebola-congo-
rwanda.html [https://perma.cc.4GUC-QZJV]. 
 32. Ebola Vaccines – Background Paper for SAGE Deliberations, WORLD HEALTH ORG. 
(Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.who.int/immunization/sage/meetings/2018/october/2_Ebola_SAGE 
2018Oct_BgDoc_20180919.pdf [https://perma.cc/V4Q3-JGG9]. 
 33. WHO Ebola Response Team, After Ebola in West Africa - Unpredictable Risks, 
Preventable Epidemics, 375 NEW ENG. J. MED. 587, 588 (2016). 
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28,616 suspected, probable, and confirmed cases of EVD were reported.”34 A 
total of 11,310 deaths were attributed to the outbreak.35 The largest numbers of 
cases and deaths occurred in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, but thirty-six 
cases were reported from Italy, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Spain, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States.36 After peaking at approximately 950 
confirmed cases per week in September of 2014, the incidence dropped 
precipitously toward the end of that year.37 
The IHR in 2005 required Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone to have 
surveillance and detection infrastructure in place to detect Ebola and to promptly 
notify WHO should they receive a reportable event.38 Civil wars in or affecting 
all three countries had devastated what weak health infrastructure existed, and 
external assistance would have been critical to bridge the gap between their 
capacity and what the IHR envisioned. This is true in many countries, and initial 
information led many in the international community to believe Ebola would be 
contained in West Africa as it had in equatorial Africa. Because WHO 
maintained significant activities in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone and cases 
reported in Guinea and Liberia between April and May technically declined, 
WHO, for example, believed that that the virus dynamics were not unlike those 
of past outbreaks.39 
B. Background to the 2017 Ebola outbreak in DRC 
The DRC has a long history with detecting and responding to EVD. The 
virus was first identified near the eponymous Ebola River in then-Zaire, in 
1976.40 Since 1976, there have been ten Ebola outbreaks in the DRC.41 This 
experience played a role in the commitment of the central government in 
Kinshasa to specialized laboratory, health worker, and health facility 
infrastructure for Ebola response.  
“On April 22, 2017, the Nambwa health center received a 45-year-old (early 
reports stated 39-year-old) male subject with presenting symptoms including 
 
 34. Id. at 587. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id.; see also 2014-2016 Ebola Outbreak in West Africa, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/history/2014-2016-outbreak/index.html [https://per 
ma.cc/A3T8-EFGD] (last reviewed Mar. 8, 2019). 
 37. WHO Ebola Response Team, supra note 33, at 587. 
 38. WORLD HEALTH ORG., International Health Regulations (3rd ed. 2005). 
 39. Wolfgang Hein, Response to the West African Ebola Outbreak (2014-16): A Failure of 
Global Health Governance?, in Leonie Vierck, THE GOVERNANCE OF DISEASE OUTBREAKS, 
INTERNATIONAL HEALTH LAW: LESSONS FROM THE EBOLA CRISIS AND BEYOND 68 (2017). 
 40. History of Ebola Virus Disease, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/history/summaries.html [https://perma.cc/8LSY-67HX] (last 
reviewed Sept. 18, 2018). 
 41. History of Ebola in the Democratic Republic of Congo, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
https://www.who.int/ebola/historical-outbreaks-drc/en/ [https://perma.cc/8QBK-HDEA]. 
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fever, asthenia, vomiting of blood, bloody diarrhea, hematuria, epistaxis and 
extreme fatigue.”42 “He was referred to the Reference General Hospital (RGH) 
of Likati.” He died twelve kilometers before reaching the facility.43 He traveled 
by motorbike and taxi across the large province.44 His blood was drawn on May 
1, 2017.45 “A few days later, the driver and the person behind the motorcycle 
carrying the index case developed the same signs and symptoms.”46 “An 
investigation was initiated and five (5) samples were collected.”47 “It took 10 
days for the samples to reach Kinshasa, which is about 1400 kilometers from 
Likati.”48 The DRC has no roads that span the country and long-distance travel 
largely is restricted to river boats and private airplanes.  
On May 9, 2017, the DRC’s Ministry of Health informed WHO about the 
undiagnosed illness and deaths including hemorrhagic symptoms in Likati 
Health Zone, Bas Uele Province which is in the northern region of the DRC that 
borders the Central African Republic.49 The DRC Ministry of Health was able 
within two days to confirm Ebola virus subtype Zaire at the Institut National de 
Recherche Biomédicale (INRB) in Kinshasa.50 Even before laboratory 
confirmation, on May 10, 2017, a multidisciplinary team led by the Ministry of 
Health and supported by WHO and partners was deployed to the field; the team 
reached the affected area on May 13, 2017 to conduct a field investigation.51 All 
contacts (538) were identified immediately and monitored. The possibility of 
introducing an Ebola ring vaccination with experimental vaccine rVSV-ZEBOV 
was immediately discussed. The DRC approved the experimental vaccine 
rVSV-ZEBOV for use in 2017, although the outbreak ended before the vaccine 
 
 42. INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES, 
Emergency Plan of Action Democratic Republic of Congo: Ebola Outbreak (May 15, 2017), 
https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/democratic-republic-congo-drc-ebola-out 
break-emergency-plan-action [https://perma.cc/PG7D-PEGQ]. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Jon Cohen, Will Vaccine Help Curb Ebola Outbreak in DRC?, AM. ASSOC. FOR THE 
ADVANCEMENT OF SCI. (May 15, 2017), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/05/updated-will-
vaccine-help-curb-new-ebola-outbreak-drc [https://perma.cc/783A-WLYE]. 
 46. INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES, supra note 
42. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Cohen, supra note 45. 
 49. Ebola Virus Disease, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets 
/detail/ebola-virus-disease [https://perma.cc/DWC6-CG67] (last visited Aug. 23, 2019). 
 50. New technology allows for rapid diagnosis of Ebola in Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
WORLD HEALTH ORG. AFRICA, https://www.afro.who.int/news/new-technology-allows-rapid-
diagnosis-ebola-democratic-republic-congo [https://perma.cc/QRU6-PCX3] (last visited Aug. 23, 
2019). 
 51. WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 49. 
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shipped.52 By May 15, there were nineteen suspected cases, one confirmed case, 
and three deaths.53 While suspected cases were spread across three health zones, 
the deaths occurred only in Nambwa.54 The 2017 Ebola outbreak in the DRC 
affected eight people, four of whom died.55 One-hundred and five cases, for 
whom laboratory tests revealed negative results, were recorded.56 The outbreak 
was declared over on July 2, 2017, when the last patient had tested negative for 
Ebola a second time.57 
a. Responsible Authorities (IHR Article 4) 
Article 4 of the IHR requires, in pertinent part, that countries “disseminat[e] 
information to, and consolidat[e] input from, relevant sectors of the 
administration of the State Party concerned, including those responsible for 
surveillance and reporting, points of entry, public health services, clinics and 
hospitals, and other government departments.”58  
i. West Africa 
In 2014 in Guinea (and the border with Sierra Leone and Liberia), the 
“sectors . . . including those responsible for surveillance and reporting” were 
largely controlled by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and foreign aid 
workers.59 Many of these NGOs providing health services in Guinea and Sierra 
Leone worked under agreements that authorized the sharing of relevant data only 
with official health authorities and, in some cases, only with specific 
administrators.60 Requests by other NGOs for information, especially for contact 
lists, were frequently rejected.61 For instance, one district-level Ebola response 
center in Sierra Leone found it problematic that NGOs engaged in contact 
 
 52. Erika C. Hayden, Experimental Drugs Poised for Use in Ebola Outbreak, NATURE (May 
18, 2018), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-05205-x [https://perma.cc/T5Z9-Z9GA]. 
 53. Emergency Plan of Action (EPoA) Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): Ebola 
Outbreak, INT’L FED’N OF RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT SOC’Y (May 15, 2017), http://adore.if 
rc.org/Download.aspx?FileId=162853. 
 54. Id. 
 55. 2017 Democratic Republic of the Congo, Bas Uélé District, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL 
AND PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/drc/2017-may.html [https://perma.cc 
/W7DZ-H4ZV] (last visited Aug. 23, 2019). 
 56. The Ebola Epidemic Defeated in the DRC, ALIMA, https://www.alima-ngo.org/en/the-
ebola-epidemic-defeated-in-the-drc [https://perma.cc/TC8N-9MJ9] (last visited Sept. 9, 2019). 
 57. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra note 55. 
 58. WORLD HEALTH ORG., NAT’L IHR FOCAL POINT GUIDE, Designation/establishment of 
National IHR Focal Points, at 1 (2005). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Leon Schreiber, Chasing an Epidemic: Coordinating Liberia’s Response to Ebola, 
INNOVATION FOR SUCCESSFUL SOCIETIES, 2017, at 3. 
 61. Pushed to the Limit and Beyond: A year into the largest ever Ebola outbreak, MEDECINS 
SANS FRONTIERES, 2015, at 8. 
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tracing spontaneously but in coordination with their role of providing supplies 
to families in quarantine.62 The NGOs “took it upon themselves to start taking 
temperatures, recording travel and contact histories.”63 “There was already a 
contact-tracing team from Sierra Leone’s official District Ebola Response 
Centre visiting them over several days to monitor symptoms and gather 
information on exposure to risk.”64 There were several other organizations 
visiting or doing similar activities, undermining the role of the centralized, 
official authority.65  
Even within the formal arms of the state, there were important barriers to 
consolidating and disseminating relevant information.66 A retrospective study 
by Chatham House noted that the governments, particularly in Guinea and Sierra 
Leone, were conflicted about the relevance of information for compliance with 
the IHR versus its potential for economic damage.67 In some cases, the flow of 
information to leaders was itself not clear: “[there was a perception that] no one 
in authority wanted to admit to [Sierra Leone] President Koroma how bad the 
situation was.”68 In the Sierra Leone response, British participants stated that 
“by late July 2014 they had decided that information coming out of the [Sierra 
Leone Ministry of Health and Sanitation] had to be ignored.”69 
In a report by the WHO Ebola Interim Assessment Panel in January 2015, it 
acknowledged that “problems with information flow and decision-making 
within WHO[,] and difficult negotiations with countries” explained much of the 
failure to respond as robustly as it should have, and those problems and 
negotiations involved desires primarily by Guinea and Sierra Leone to control 
or delay the messaging about a health emergency.70 “Ministries overseeing both 
the economy and finance [in Sierra Leone] were concerned about what closing 
the borders would mean to the post-conflict improvements in Sierra Leone’s 
economic outlook, which in early 2014 were significant and promising.”71 
Liberia better integrated international stakeholders. It relatively rapidly 
reached out to the U.S. National Institutes of Health to work on the deployment 
of promising therapeutic and vaccine candidates, ensuring that protocols to 
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administer those candidates could be done ethically and efficaciously.72 The 
Liberia Ministry of Health and Social Welfare was organized so that a National 
Technical Management Coordinator aggregated epidemiological, surveillance, 
mental health, contact tracing, case management, and laboratory data.73 If the 
national coordinator was not available, then data bottlenecked, a problem that 
was resolved by the appointment of an incident manager and a deputy incident 
manager that coordinated with large external entities like the CDC.74 
ii. The DRC 
Before the 2017 outbreak of Ebola, the universe of stakeholders, including 
points of entry, public health services, clinics and hospitals, and other 
government departments for Ebola response was, and is, relatively defined in 
DRC. First, the provision of healthcare and the surveillance and reporting roles 
is undertaken by public authorities under central ministry supervision or 
coordinated with NGOs. Second, when Ebola cases emerge in remote areas of 
the DRC, data about illnesses and deaths is clearly associated with known 
pathogens that prevail in the country so that Ebola may be quickly distinguished 
and diagnosed. 
In August 2014, the Ministry of Public Health updated its National Plan for 
the Preparation and Response to the Ebola Virus Disease Outbreak, not only 
because of the outbreak in West Africa, but because a new case had developed 
in Boende district, Equateur province, unrelated to the outbreak in West 
Africa.75 The revised plan included coordination with WHO, UNICEF, MSF, 
and CDC.76 On May 13, 2017, pursuant to this plan, the government deployed a 
multidisciplinary team to assess the situation at Likati and prepare for the arrival 
of the main response team.77 Ministries, local governments, clinicians, NGOs, 
suppliers, and donors all had clear chains of reporting to the DRC Ministry of 
Health. In light of the 2014–16 emergency, “WHO had set up a $41 million 
contingency fund to ensure that money would be readily available for future 
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[Ebola] emergencies.”78 This fund allowed organizations authorized by the 
Ministry of Health “to quickly rent helicopters for flying personnel, generators, 
and supplies into Likati.”79 
Between April 22 and May 10, the government set up coordination 
committees at national, provincial, and local levels; expanded training of 
healthcare personnel; contacted publicly recognized figures to raise awareness; 
and drafted lists of contacts and family members.80 The aforementioned 
committees covered surveillance, medical care, laboratory and research, 
communication and social mobilization, water, hygiene and sanitation, 
psychosocial care, and logistics.81  
b. Surveillance (IHR Article 5) 
Article 5 of the IHR provides in relevant part that “[e]ach State Party shall 
develop, strengthen and maintain, as soon as possible but no later than five years 
from the entry into force of these Regulations for that State Party, the capacity 
to detect, assess, notify and report events in accordance with these Regulations 
. . . .”82 
i. West Africa 
Before the Ebola outbreak, Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone had suffered 
from devastating civil wars or internal conflict, which leveled a corresponding 
effect on the countries’ health system infrastructure. Under WHO assessments, 
their health infrastructures were among the weakest in the world. These weak 
infrastructures led to two related problems in the context of surveillance.83 
“First, the provision of healthcare and the surveillance and reporting roles often 
undertaken by public authorities were fractured among dozens of non-
governmental organizations, many of which paid higher salaries or offered 
employment on more favorable terms than state-administered entities of the 
healthcare system.”84 “These organizations maintained non-uniform systems for 
collecting, centralizing, analyzing and transferring data” about possible EVD 
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cases.85 “Second, when EVD cases emerged in remote areas of the most affected 
countries, data about illnesses and deaths was confused with other common 
causes of morbidity and mortality that occurred at high rates in all three 
countries.”86 
“Inconsistent and haphazardly collected and transmitted data bottlenecked 
at the hospital, ministry, and international levels.”87 “Data quoted by Sierra 
Leone’s Ministry of Health and Sanitation, for example, were inconsistent with 
WHO’s which was in turn inconsistent with determinations made by responders 
reporting from the field.”88 “MSF, interpreting data based on the geographic 
dispersion of cases confirmed through methods other than laboratory 
confirmation and identification of family networks crossing Guinea, Liberia, and 
Sierra Leone, determined that cases were spreading in the latter well before May 
26, when the first case was officially confirmed.”89 “The result was data that 
justified both action and inaction by relevant stakeholders, with other political 
and economic pressures favoring the latter from March until July 2014.”90  
“In Sierra Leone, the Ministry of Health and Sanitation shared data 
infrequently and haphazardly with its own National Ebola Response Centre 
(NERC) (which integrated UK DFID, UN, and other international 
stakeholders),” but it was more readily shared with the WHO.91 “NERC received 
summary data, but not detailed data relevant to its activities.”92 “WHO would 
publish its data according to its own criteria which affected the credibility of 
data issued by the NERC, which in turn had to request data from UK DFID and 
other aid or public health agencies.”93 “The delay had material, significant 
effect.”94 “According to one study, if resources committed in September and 
delivered in October had done so one month earlier, 12,500 cases could have 
been prevented.”95 
“Health workers immediately started tracking [individuals] who had contact 
with infected individuals, eventually tracing 583 such contacts.”96 Because there 
are few or no accurate maps of the area, volunteers used their cellphones to start 
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charting the region.97 Villages in the Bas Uele province are generally only 
accessible on foot or by bicycle or motorbike, and transferring suspect cases 
safely to Ebola Treatment Centers was not possible. Outreach teams from the 
Ministry of Health visited those who were ill, took blood samples, and provided 
advice and medical supplies to treat the sick at home.98 
Related to the training and education of DRC’s workforce, its laboratory 
capacity for Ebola detection was relatively well developed while it also made 
use of rapid diagnostics and mobile laboratory technologies developed in West 
Africa as part of its response.99 Before more rapid Ebola diagnostics were 
developed, several methods for detecting infection and/or disease with Ebola 
virus had been developed that were amenable for use in clinical laboratory 
settings.100 Those methods fell into three basic categories: “(i) serologic tests 
that detect host antibodies generated against the virus, (ii) antigen tests that 
detect viral proteins, and (iii) molecular tests that detect viral RNA 
sequences.”101 Tests (i) and (ii) were available at the national laboratory in 
Kinshasa.102 
The DRC made use of rapid-diagnostics that could be confirmed on the 
ground within an hour and at the national laboratory in Kinshasa within a day. 
The results from the first samples, subsequently confirmed by the Centre 
International de Recherche Médicale de Franceville, a WHO collaborating 
center in Gabon, showed the index case to have died from EVD.103 “As soon as 
the outbreak was detected, the Ministry of Health, together with WHO and other 
partners, mobilized laboratory resources to ensure investigations could be 
conducted as quickly as possible to guide the response.”104 “In addition to the 
testing facilities available at the INRB in Kinshasa, an INRB mobile field lab 
was quickly dispatched to the affected health zone of Likati.”105 
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c. Notification (IHR Article 6) 
IHR Article 6 governing notification of relevant public health events 
requires that:  
a State Party shall continue to communicate to WHO timely, accurate and 
sufficiently detailed public health information available to it on the notified 
event, where possible including case definitions, laboratory results, source and 
type of the risk, number of cases and deaths, conditions affecting the spread of 
the disease and the health measures employed; and report, when necessary, the 
difficulties faced and support needed in responding to the potential public health 
emergency of international concern.106 
i. West Africa 
Although WHO released official case definitions of confirmed, probable, 
and suspected Ebola cases, different countries adopted different testing 
strategies, thereby limiting the opportunity for inter-country comparison. 
Limited experience caused many cases to be over looked.  
By 23 March 2014, a few scattered cases had already been imported from Guinea 
into Liberia and Sierra Leone, but these cases were not detected, investigated, 
or formally reported to WHO. The outbreaks in these two countries likewise 
smouldered for weeks, eventually becoming visible as chains of transmission 
multiplied, spilled into capital cities, and became so numerous they could no 
longer be traced.107 
In Liberia, ministries (including port, airport, finance, health, and 
environment), local governments, clinicians, NGOs, suppliers, and donors all 
collected data related to identifying cases and taking immediate action, but there 
was “no information sharing” because there was no centralized authority or 
resource to do so.108 Even within data collected, inconsistences limited 
usefulness. “Dates recorded on a case document might have referred 
ambiguously to when data was collected, submitted, or edited.”109 
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ii. DRC 
The Provincial Health Division issued an alert on May 8, 2017, seventeen 
days after the death of the index case, and on May 9, the DRC’s Ministry of 
Health informed WHO about undiagnosed illness and deaths including 
hemorrhagic symptoms in the Likati Health Zone.110 On May 11, the INRB in 
Kinshasa confirmed that one of five samples sent from Likati had tested positive 
for Ebola, and the Ministry of Heath established seven national committees and 
dispatched investigative teams111 
In April 2017, the WHO’s Strategic Advisory Group of Experts 
recommended use of an experimental Ebola vaccine should an outbreak occur, 
delivered in a ring vaccination strategy and under an Expanded Access 
Framework.112 Pursuant to the recommendation, the DRC Ministry of Health 
established ethics review and regulatory channels for approval of the 
experimental vaccine under an Expanded (or Compassionate Use) Access 
Framework.113 On May 11, the DRC Ministry of Health initiated discussions on 
the use of experimental vaccine with WHO and MSF.114 “A WHO/Global 
Outbreak Alert and Response Network team and an MSF Ebola vaccine team 
were deployed to support implementation.”115 
Communication between the Ministry of Health, Merck (the manufacturer 
of the vaccine), MSF, and WHO was fluid and frequent during the outbreak, and 
the DRC maintained both ethics review and regulatory channels for approval of 
the experimental vaccine rVSV-ZEBOV, which was approved for priority 
groups on May 29.116 The Ministry of Health in partnership with WHO 
developed a plan for establishing and maintaining a cold chain for the vaccine, 
including borrowing a -60°C -90°C freezer from the Ministry of Health in 
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Guinea, which was packed and ready to be shipped in forty-eight hours.117 Total 
time for all logistics, including transportation of doses from a stockpile in 
Geneva, was one week post approval.118 The ethics review committee discussed 
with MSF forms for informed consent and a ring vaccination strategy to 
immunize contacts of suspected and confirmed patients, the contacts of those 
contacts, and health workers.119 The outbreak was contained before these plans 
became necessary to operationalize. 
d. Public Health Response (IHR Article 13) 
Article 13 of the IHR requires “Each State Party shall develop, strengthen 
and maintain, as soon as possible but no later than five years from the entry into 
force of these Regulations . . . the capacity to respond promptly and effectively 
to public health risks and public health emergencies of international concern as 
set out in Annex 1.”120 Article 13 further includes the ability of countries to 
request assistance from WHO, including the coordination of international 
partners for public health emergencies of international concern.121 
i. West Africa 
As for surveillance and detection, capacity to respond was significantly 
limited in the most affected West African countries, and that capacity was 
largely spread over the informal sector.122 The public health response, between 
March and July 2014 was not generally mediated through national governments, 
but rather through entities employed by major funders: the Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation, CDC, the CDC Foundation, DFID, the Paul Allen Foundation, the 
UK government, and USAID among the most significant.123 These entities 
experienced barriers coordinating responses between themselves. “Without 
agreement about the mutually beneficial roles, responsibilities, and legitimate 
contributions of clinicians, scientists, and public health authorities, parties end 
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up either encroaching on one another or not communicating.”124 These practices 
are reflected in the retrospective reports entities drafted for donors and others, 
emphasizing number of geographic locations in which there was a presence, 
number of volunteers trained, and number of staff hired.125 
ii. DRC 
The 2017 outbreak was guided by the International Health Regulations, the 
response component of which had been informed by the experience in Guinea, 
Liberia, and Sierra Leone. The DRC’s 2018 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) 
demonstrated “a considerable commitment of the authorities of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo in the process of improving the implementation capacity of 
the IHR (2005) through the creation of a Congolese agency for the prevention 
and control of diseases and the establishment of short-term plan for an integrated 
and multisectoral national plan for strengthening health security.”126 Its highest 
scores (three or four indicating, respectively, developed capacity and 
demonstrated capacity) under the JEE framework were for its system of 
epidemiological training, its strategy for its healthcare workforce, and its 
emergency response program.127 
In addition, the National Plan Health Development Plan 2016-2020 and the 
Guide to Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response revised in 2011 include 
provisions for the adequate implementation of the IHR (2005).128 In most 
sectors, there is legislation, regulations, administrative requirements, and other 
relevant government instruments for the implementation of the IHR (2005). At 
the institutional level, the NFP RSI is appointed within the National Border 
Hygiene attached to the Ministry of Health. The country also has a National 
Coordinating Committee (NCC) within the Ministry of Health in the event of an 
outbreak.129 
While the DRC still faces significant barriers with respect to the adoption 
and dissemination of laws relevant to the IHR, communication and coordination 
between ministries, surveillance capacity, its NFP, national coordinating 
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committee, and emergency response plans functioned well in support of the 
response to the 2017 outbreak. This coordination was attributed to agreements 
that clearly defined roles, transparent and agreed-upon categories of data needed 
for the trials to show evidence of safety and efficacy, and adequate resources to 
enroll volunteers, conduct trials, and gather information. Response was run from 
the central government generally and Kinshasa specifically, where dedicated 
committees executed clear, well-defined roles. The national government 
established committees overseeing surveillance, medical care, laboratory and 
research, communication and social mobilization, water, hygiene and sanitation, 
psychosocial care, and logistics. While major non-governmental organizations 
and international organizations including ALIMA, IFRC, MSF, UNICEF, and 
WHO were invited to participate in the response, they did so according to a 
national emergency action plan overseen by DRC authorities. Before the 2017 
outbreak, the previous eight largest outbreaks of Ebola took on average two 
months to be recognized and confirmed; the 2017 outbreak took only nineteen 
days.130  
After alerting international partners on May 9, consistent with its national 
plan of action, the Ministry of Health dispatched a team including doctors, 
nurses, logisticians, water and sanitation experts, health promoters, and an 
epidemiologist.131 On the same day, MSF sent a team of fourteen support staff 
including physicians.132 On May 12, a cargo plane with fifteen tons of medical 
and logistical supplies flew from Kinshasa to Kisangani, which is connected to 
Buta, the capital of Bas Uele Province, by a newly repaired road stretching 324 
km.133 Likati is 150 km from Buta over rugged terrain, but all people and 
supplies nevertheless arrived in Buta on May 16.134 By May 17, aid groups were 
setting up centers for treatment and isolation, and mobile labs.135 Health centers 
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throughout the province regularly sent out alerts through the national 
surveillance system.136  
A number of community engagement mechanisms enabled more rapid 
public health response. Most villages in the Bas Uele province are only 
accessible on foot or by bicycle or motorbike.137 “Outreach teams from the 
Ministry of Health and with partner support, visit those who are ill, take blood 
samples and provide advice and medical supplies to treat the sick at home.”138 
Communicators about Ebola, especially how to prevent its spread, were selected 
according to their credibility in the community, literacy, and willingness to 
participate.139 The Ministry of Health worked with UNICEF and WHO to 
develop a two-day training for these volunteers, who spread out to the 
surrounding health zones to inform the public about how to protect themselves 
from Ebola and avoid spread of the disease.140 Jean-Jacques Muyembe-Tamfum, 
director-general of the National Institute for Biomedical Research in Kinshasa, 
engaged affected communities immediately, building their trust in medical 
teams and helping them understand the importance of not touching others in 
checking the spread of the virus.141 
Surveillance, health facility, and clinical data was shared rapidly through the 
channels described above. The Ebola containment effort added several places 
not reflected on existing maps (towns and villages), often on the basis of 
descriptions from local sources. Some places already present in the RGC were 
re-localized when GPS recordings or recent digitizations were available from 
other sources. Because contact tracing was so swift and shared so readily 
between responding partners (ALIMA, CDC, MSF, and WHO), Ministry of 
Health personnel were able to confirm two cases of Ebola quickly and identify 
and follow the next and final six that followed. By May 28, there were seventeen 
suspected cases in the DRC awaiting a diagnosis, and all contacts remained 
under surveillance.142 Sixty-seven percent of the computer simulations run by 
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DRC Ministry of Health predicted that there would be no further cases in the 
next month, and the outbreak was declared over on July 2, forty-two days after 
the last confirmed case tested negative for Ebola the second time (two twenty-
one day incubation cycles of the virus).143 
CONCLUSION 
There are models for effective Ebola response that demonstrate the 
soundness of the IHR (2005) and provide good models for the integration of 
international partners. These models often grow from previous experiences with 
emergencies governed by the IHR, including those where a PHEIC is not 
declared. Indeed, in the current outbreak in the DRC participation of 
international partners has been crucial, even if data and response coordination 
remains imperfect and also faces a stronger, militarized resistance. In the context 
of the Ebola outbreak in the DRC, rapid containment was achieved in the face 
of significant resource scarcity, poor physical infrastructure, and limited 
healthcare infrastructure. Because the DRC acted quickly, through a framework 
consistent with the International Health Regulations, especially as they 
functioned in 2014-16 West Africa; invested in the training of its best doctors 
and nurses to the Ebola threat; communicated clearly and through credible 
outlets; devoted resources to contact tracing and surveillance; and established 
regulatory channels for diagnostics and vaccines, it was able to identify and 
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